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Abstract	  In	  the	  last	  two	  decades,	  many	  new	  democracies	  have	  adopted	  a	  semi-­‐presidential	  system.	   However,	   scholarship	   still	   tends	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   negative	   effects	   of	   the	  system.	   Scholars	   believe	   that	   semi-­‐presidentialism	  may	   encourage	   contradictory	  and	   ineffectual	   policies	   leading	   to	   government	   instability	   and	   democratic	  breakdown.	  In	  particular,	  cohabitation	  is	  considered	  to	  foster	  institutional	  conflict.	  	  This	   paper	   examines	   whether	   cohabitation	   is	   as	   problematic	   as	   the	   literature	  suggests.	  It	  does	  so,	  by	  analysing	  the	  effect	  of	  cohabitation	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  a	  young	  democratic	  state	  in	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  setting.	  This	  paper	  confirms	  that	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  cohabitation	  encouraged	  institutional	  conflict	  specifically,	  but	  not	  exclusively,	  over	  issues	   related	   to	  national	   security	   and	  defence.	   In	   addition,	   it	   shows	   that	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	   post-­‐conflict	   context	   influenced	   institutional	   conflict	   and	   prevented	  democratic	   institutions	   from	   working	   optimally.	   The	   paper	   concludes	   that	  cohabitation	   in	   young	   democratic	   states	   outside	   Europe	   may	   be	   more	   perilous	  than	  recent	  literature	  on	  semi-­‐presidential	  systems	  suggests.	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INTRODUCTION	  	  When,	  in	  January	  1995,	  the	  President	  of	  Niger,	  Mahamane	  Ousmane,	  was	  forced	  to	  appoint	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   opposition	   party	   MNSD1,	   Hama	   Amadou,	   as	   Prime	  Minister	  Niger	   entered	   into	  a	   “political	   and	   constitutional	   guerrilla”	   that	   “led	   the	  country	   into	   a	   political	   deadlock	   and	   on	   the	   brink	   of	   a	   civil	   war”	   (Grégoire	   and	  Sardan,	  1996).	  The	  situation	  of	  “conflictual	  cohabitation”	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  armed	  forces	  to	  organise	  a	  military	  coup	  (Moestrup,	  2007a).	  The	  root	  cause	  of	   Nigeria’s	   constitutional	   crisis	   was,	   according	   to	   Moestrup,	   Niger’s	   semi-­‐presidential	  system.	  She	  concluded	  that	  “had	  the	  regime	  been	  a	  purely	  presidential	  regime	  or	  a	  parliamentary	  one,	  an	  important	  source	  of	  political	  conflict	  would	  have	  been	  eliminated:	   the	  continuous	  stand-­‐off	  between	  president	  and	  prime	  minister	  over	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  relative	  powers”	  (Moestrup,	  2007a:	  115).	  	  	   Some	  people	   considered	  Niger	   a	   textbook	  example	  of	   the	  danger	  of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   for	   the	   viability	   of	   young	   democracies.	   They	   claimed	   that	   the	  existence	  of	  a	  president	  and	  a	  prime	  minister	  at	   the	  helm	  of	   the	  state	   introduces	  competing	  incentives	  into	  the	  system.	  The	  problem	  becomes	  acute	  in	  a	  situation	  of	  cohabitation	   were	   the	   president	   and	   the	   prime	   minister	   are	   from	   opposing	  political	  groups.	  According	  to	  Elgie	  (2008;	  2010),	  Niger	  is	  the	  only	  example	  where	  the	   collapse	   of	   electoral	   democracy	   has	   coincided	  with	   cohabitation.	   Based	   on	   a	  statistical	   analysis,	   Elgie	   and	   McMenamin	   (2011)	   concluded	   that	   cohabitation	  emerges	   in	  democratic	  countries	   that	  are	  able	   to	  regulate	  conflict	  and,	   therefore,	  do	   not	   collapse.	   They	   argued	   that	   cohabitation	   is	   perhaps	   less	   perilous	   than	   the	  literature	  suggests.	  	  
	   This	  paper	  examines	  the	  effect	  of	  cohabitation	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  The	  findings	  confirm	   that,	   like	   in	   Niger,	   cohabitation	   encouraged	   institutional	   conflict	   and	  encouraged	   the	  military	   to	   interfere	   in	  political	   affairs.	   In	  Timor-­‐Leste,	   however,	  cohabitation	   threatened	   government	   stability	   but	   did	   not	   lead	   to	   democratic	  breakdown.	  	  The	  paper	   is	  structured	  as	   follows.	  The	   first	  section	  summarises	  what	  has	  been	   written	   about	   semi-­‐presidential	   systems	   and	   cohabitation.	   Based	   on	   the	  literature	   review,	   the	   second	   section	   presents	   the	   research	   design	   and	   the	  main	  hypotheses	   that	   will	   be	   tested.	   The	   third	   section	   presents	   the	   main	   findings	   in	  relation	   to	   the	   hypotheses.	   The	   final	   section	   discusses	   whether	   the	   empirical	  findings	  support	  or	  confound	  the	  arguments	  associated	  with	  cohabitation.	  	  	  	  SEMI-­‐PRESIDENTIALISM	  AND	  COHABITATION	  	  Research	  on	  the	  specific	  effects	  of	  cohabitation	  on	  democratic	  performance	  comes	  under	   the	   heading	   of	   a	   much	   broader	   strand	   of	   literature	   that	   examines	   the	  relative	   merits	   of	   presidentialism	   and	   parliamentarism	   (Lijphart,	   1992;	   Weaver	  and	  Rockman,	  1993;	  Linz,	  1994;	  Sartori,	  1994;	  Tsebelis,	  1995).	  Originally,	  the	  work	  of	  Juan	  Linz	  (1990;	  1994)	  dominated	  the	  debate.	  He	  presented	  several	  arguments	  against	   presidential	   systems	   and	   concluded	   that	   parliamentarism	   is	   more	  conductive	   to	   stable	   democracy	   than	   presidentialism.	   The	   crux	   of	   his	   thesis	  was	  that	  not	  only	  are	  presidential	  systems	  more	  likely	  to	  generate	  executive-­‐legislative	  conflict	   but	   these	   conflicts	   are	   also	   more	   prone	   to	   lead	   to	   legislative	   deadlock.	  Because	  presidential	  systems	  lack	  a	  constitutional	  principle	  to	  resolve	  the	  standoff,	  
such	  as	  the	  vote	  of	  no-­‐confidence	  in	  parliamentary	  regimes,	  deadlock	  encourages	  actors	  to	  search	  for	  extra-­‐constitutional	  means	  of	  resolving	  their	  differences.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  presidential	  systems	  are	  more	  prone	  to	  democratic	  breakdown	  than	  parliamentary	   systems.	   Linz’s	   thesis	   was	   discussed	   in	   theoretical	   works	  (Mainwaring,	  1993;	  Mainwaring	  and	  Shugart,	  1997)	  and	  his	   arguments	   tested	   in	  small-­‐n	   and	   large-­‐n	   studies	   (Stepan	   and	   Skach,	   1993;	   Power	   and	   Gasiorowski,	  1997;	  Przeworski	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Cheibub	  and	  Chernykh,	  2008;	  Gerring	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  	  Most	   studies	   confirmed	   that	   presidential	   systems	   are	   likely	   to	   survive	   less	   long	  than	   parliamentary	   systems,	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   the	   works	   of	   Power	   and	  Gasiorowski	   (1997)	   and	   Cheibub	   (2007).	   Whereas	   Power	   and	   Gasiorwski	  concluded	  that	  the	  constitutional	  form	  is	  unrelated	  to	  democratic	  survival,	  Cheibub	  confirmed	  that	  presidential	  democracies	  live	  less	  longer.	  However,	  for	  Cheibub,	  the	  system’s	  low	  survival	  rate	  is	  rooted	  not	  in	  inherently	  flawed	  institutions	  but	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  historically	  presidentialism	  emerged	  in	  political	  environments	  that	  were	  less	  propitious	  for	  democratic	  survival.	  Finally,	  recent	  research	  has	  questioned	  the	  validity	   of	   concepts	   like	   “presidentialism”	   and	   “parliamentarism”	   (Cheibub	   et	   al.,	  2010;	   Fortin,	   2012).	   Given	   the	   institutional	   variation	   within,	   in	   particular,	  presidential	   systems	   the	  explanatory	  power	  of	   the	   concept	   is,	   according	   to	   these	  scholars,	  open	  to	  question.	  	   The	   advantages	   and	   disadvantages	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   compared	   to	  presidential	   and	   parliamentary	   systems	   was	   examined	   by	   Shugart	   and	   Carey	  (1992).	   These	   scholars	   claimed	   that	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   as	   a	   category	   separate	  from	   presidentialism	   and	   parliamentarism	   did	   not	   have	   enough	   explanatory	  power.	   According	   to	   them,	   the	   concept	   needed	   to	   be	   broken	   down	   into	   two	  different	   concepts,	   namely	   premier-­‐presidential	   and	   president-­‐parliamentary	  
systems.	  Shugart	  and	  Carey	  concluded	   that	  president-­‐parliamentary	  democracies	  where	  authority	  over	  the	  cabinet	  is	  shared	  between	  president	  and	  legislature	  run	  a	  greater	   risk	  of	   collapse	   than	   their	  premier-­‐presidential	   counterparts.	   In	  addition,	  and	  contrary	  to	  the	  academic	  consensus	  against	  presidentialism,	  they	  held	  that	  in	  certain	  contexts	  presidential	  or	  premier-­‐presidential	  systems	  are	   to	  be	  preferred	  over	   parliamentary	   systems.	   Shugart	   and	   Carey	   claimed	   that	   under	   certain	  circumstances,	   “as	  when	   one	   party	   dominates	   such	   that	   it	  might	   be	   able	   to	  win	  control	   over	   the	   executive	   by	   itself	   under	   parliamentarism,	   a	   presidential	   or	  premier-­‐presidential	   regime	   might	   even	   offer	   better	   opportunities	   for	   conflict	  regulation	  than	  would	  a	  parliamentary	  regime”	  (1992:	  286).	  	  	   By	   contrast,	   another	   strand	   of	   literature	   on	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   has	  focused	   on	   the	   system’s	   institutional	   flaws.	   The	   primary	   feature	   of	   a	   semi-­‐presidential	   system	   is	   the	   existence	   of	   two	   actors,	   a	   president	   and	   a	   prime	  minister.	  According	  to	  its	  critics,	  the	  existence	  of	  two	  executive	  actors	  introduces	  competing	   incentives	   into	   the	   system.	   Scholars	   identified	   different	   areas	   and	  situations	   where	   conflict	   between	   the	   dual	   executive	   could	   lead	   to	   legislative	  paralysis	   and	   democratic	   breakdown.	   Linz	   (1994)	   emphasised	   the	   danger	   of	  executive	  power	  sharing	  in	  the	  area	  of	  defence.	  He	  believed	  that	  semi-­‐presidential	  systems	   encourage	   the	   president	   and	   military	   to	   join	   forces	   thereby	   effectively	  exempting	   the	   military	   from	   civilian	   control.	   The	   semi-­‐presidential	   system,	  therefore,	   “involves	   a	   latent	   political	   and	   even	   constitutional	   crisis”	   (Linz,	   1994:	  58).	  	   The	   problem	   of	   the	   dual	   nature	   of	   the	   executive	   becomes	   evident	   in	   a	  cohabitation	   situation.	   Under	   cohabitation,	   the	   cabinet	   is	   supported	   by	   a	  parliamentary	  majority	   but	   the	   president	   and	   prime	  minister	   are	   from	  opposing	  
parties	  and	   the	  president’s	  party	   is	  not	   represented	   in	   the	   cabinet.	   In	   the	  1990s,	  most	   scholars	   were	   convinced	   that	   cohabitation	   was	   perilous	   for	   young	  democracies	   (Linz,	   1994;	   Stepan	   and	   Suleiman,	   1995;	   Linz	   and	   Stepan,	   1996).	  Shugart	  and	  Carey	  outlined	  two	  potential	  scenarios	  of	  conflict	  under	  cohabitation:	  first,	  the	  cabinet	  may	  refuse	  to	  accept	  the	  legislative	  powers	  of	  the	  president,	  and	  second,	  a	  president	  may	  refuse	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  claims	  to	  executive	  leadership	  made	   by	   an	   opposition	   assembly	   majority	   (1992:	   57).	   Thus,	   according	   to	   these	  scholars,	  cohabitation	  may	  cause	  potential	  conflict	  between	  the	  president	  and	  the	  cabinet	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   between	   the	   president	   and	   the	   parliamentary	  majority	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  	  In	   the	   beginning,	   there	   was	   only	   anecdotal	   evidence	   of	   the	   effect	   of	  cohabitation	   based	   on	   a	   small	   number	   of	   mainly	   West	   European	   countries.	  However,	   from	   the	   mid-­‐2000s	   onwards,	   scholars	   have	   examined	   the	   effect	   of	  cohabitation	   on	   democratic	   performance	   outside	   Western	   Europe	   in	   large	   n-­‐	  studies,	   small	  n-­‐studies	   in	  a	   regional	   context	   and	   in	   in-­‐depth	   single-­‐country	   case	  studies	   (Elgie	  and	  Moestrup,	  2007b;	  Elgie,	  2008;	  Elgie,	  2010;	  Elgie	  and	  Schleiter,	  2011).	   In	   a	   comparative	   study	   on	   the	   effect	   of	   cohabitation	   in	   five	   semi-­‐presidential	   countries	   in	   Eastern	   Europe	   Protsyk	   concluded	   that	   “Eastern	  European	   prime	   ministers	   were	   much	   more	   frequently	   challenged	   by	   the	  presidents	  than	  their	  Western	  European	  counterparts”	  (Protsyk,	  2005).	  Kirschke’s	  large	   n-­‐study	   in	   23	   countries	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   confirmed	   that	   divided	  executive	  power	  leads	  to	  “severe	  political	  breakdown”	  (Kirschke,	  2007).	  	  Moestrup	   (2007b)	   demonstrated	   that	   a	   particular	   subtype	   of	   the	   semi-­‐presidential	   system	   is	   vulnerable	   for	   democratic	   collapse.	   Based	   on	   a	   statistical	  analysis	   on	   the	  performance	  of	   semi-­‐presidentialism,	   she	   concluded	   that	  divided	  
government	   has	   a	   much	   more	   deleterious	   effect	   on	   president–parliamentary	  regimes	   than	  on	  premier–presidential	   ones.	  Moestrup	  used	   a	  wider	  definition	  of	  cohabitation	   because	   she	   believed	   that	   presidents	   in	   president-­‐parliamentary	  regimes	  can	  relatively	  easily	  circumvent	  a	  cohabitation	  situation	  (2007b:	  41).	  In	  a	  similar	   vein,	   Samuels	   and	   Shugart	   (2010)	   maintained	   that	   cohabitation	   is	   more	  prevalent	   in	   countries	   with	   the	   premier-­‐presidential	   subtype	   of	   semi-­‐presidentialism	   than	   in	   those	   with	   the	   president-­‐parliamentary	   subtype.	   In	   a	  statistical	   analysis,	   Elgie	   and	   McMenamin	   (2011)	   confirmed	   the	   notion	   that	  cohabitation	   is	   more	   frequently	   found	   in	   premier-­‐presidential	   democracies.	   In	  addition,	   they	   concluded	   that	   in	   consolidated	  democracies	   cohabitation	  does	  not	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  democratic	  system	  but	  can	  cause	  tensions	  within	  the	  executive.	  They	   found	  that	  “the	  conditions	  under	  which	  cohabitation	   is	  most	   likely	   to	  occur	  are	   also	   the	  ones	  under	  which	   it	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  most	   easily	  managed”	   (Elgie	   and	  McMenamin,	   2011).	   In	   other	   words,	   these	   scholars	   believe	   that	   cohabitation	   in	  president-­‐parliamentary	   systems	   may	   provoke	   democratic	   breakdown	   whereas	  cohabitation	   in	   premier-­‐presidential	   systems	   may	   encourage	   intra-­‐executive	  tension	   but	   does	   not	   threaten	   the	   survival	   of	   the	   democratic	   regime.	   Their	  conclusion	   seem	   to	   support	   the	   notion	   that	   cohabitation	   does	   not	   necessarily	  result	   in	   the	  breakdown	  of	  democracy	   (Elgie	   and	  Moestrup,	   2007a)	  or	   the	   claim	  that	   cohabitation	   and	   democratic	   survival	   are	   unrelated	   (Elgie	   and	   Schleiter,	  2011).	  In	   sum,	   there	   is	   an	  ongoing	  debate	   in	   the	   literature	  about	   the	  virtues	  and	  the	  drawbacks	  of	   a	   semi-­‐presidential	   system.	  An	   important	  part	   of	   the	  debate	   is	  focused	   on	   cohabitation	   and	   concludes	   that	   such	   a	   situation	   could	   generate	  democratic	   breakdown.	   	   However,	   the	   recent	   literature	   challenges	   the	   academic	  
consensus	  against	  cohabitation.	  This	  paper	  will	   test	  whether	  cohabitation	  helped	  or	  hindered	  democratic	  consolidation	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  	  	  	  RESEARCH	  DESIGN	  	  The	   literature	   identified	   two	   potential	   scenarios	   of	   conflict	   under	   cohabitation:	  first,	   between	   the	  president	   and	   cabinet,	   and	   second,	  between	   the	  president	   and	  the	   parliamentary	   majority	   (Shugart	   and	   Carey,	   1992).	   If	   we	   do	   not	   observe	  conflict,	  cohabitation	  may	  not	  be	  as	  problematic	  as	  those	  who	  theorise	  about	  semi-­‐presidentialism	  would	  suggest.	  Thus,	  the	  first	  and	  second	  hypothesis	  derived	  from	  work	  on	  cohabitation	  are:	  	  
H1:	  Under	  cohabitation,	  conflict	  is	  expected	  to	  take	  place	  between	  the	  president	  and	  
cabinet.	  
	  
H2:	  Under	  cohabitation,	  conflict	  is	  expected	  to	  take	  place	  between	  the	  president	  and	  
parliamentary	  majority.	  	  Linz	   (1994)	   recognised	   the	   danger	   of	   shared	   power	   and	   responsibility	   over	   the	  armed	  forces.	  He	  warned	  that	  semi-­‐presidential	  systems	  encourage	  presidents	  to	  assume	  power	  over	   the	  military	   specifically,	  but	  not	  exclusively,	   in	  a	   situation	  of	  cohabitation.	  Thus,	  the	  third	  hypothesis	  is:	  	  
H3:	  Under	  cohabitation,	  conflict	  is	  expected	  to	  take	  place	  between	  the	  president	  and	  
cabinet	  over	  defence	  policy.	  	  Each	   type	   of	   conflict	   between	   the	   president,	   the	   cabinet,	   and	   the	   parliamentary	  majority	  has	  different	  observable	  implications.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  conflict	  between	  the	  president	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   the	   cabinet	   and	   parliamentary	   majority	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	  I	  expect	  the	  president	  to:	  	   1. issue	  a	  veto;	  2. submit	  statutes	  to	  the	  court	  for	  constitutional	  review;	  3. call	  for	  a	  referendum;	  4. issue	  a	  presidential	  decree;	  5. refuse	  to	  name	  the	  prime	  minister	  and	  cabinet	  members;	  	  6. dismiss	  the	  prime	  minister	  and	  cabinet	  members;	  7. dissolve	  the	  national	  parliament;	  8. refuse	   to	   appoint	   or	   to	   dismiss	   ambassadors,	   permanent	   representatives	  and	  special	  envoys;	  9. criticise	   the	   government	   in	   messages	   to	   the	   national	   parliament	   and	  country.2	  	  In	   the	   case	   of	   conflict	   between	   the	   president	   and	   the	   parliamentary	   majority,	   I	  expect	  the	  parliament	  to:	  	   1. override	  presidential	  vetoes;	  2. reject	  presidential	  decrees;	  
3. prevent	  the	  president	  from	  making	  state	  visits;	  4. start	  impeachment	  proceedings	  against	  the	  president;	  5. refrain	   from	  enacting	   laws	  which	  empower	   the	  president	   to	   fully	  exercise	  his	  constitutional	  competencies.	  	  The	  third	  hypothesis	  is	  of	  a	  different	  order.	  It	  does	  not	  point	  to	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  sanction	  but	  to	  the	  policy	  area	  were	  conflict	  is	  expected	  to	  occur.	  In	  other	  words,	  different	   forms	   of	   sanctions	   are	   expected	   to	   be	   used	   pertaining	   to	   the	   area	   of	  defence	  and	  national	  security.	  	  
Case	  Selection	  The	   three	   hypotheses	   that	   are	   derived	   from	   literature	   on	   cohabitation	   will	   be	  tested	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  a	  semi-­‐presidential	  democracy.	  There	  are	  three	  reasons	  for	  selecting	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  First,	  Timor-­‐Leste	  is	  post-­‐conflict	  state	  with	  no	  democratic	  tradition.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  a	  crucial	  case	  to	  test	  the	  arguments	  associating	  the	  effects	  of	   institutions	   and	   democratic	   performance.	   If	   the	   semi-­‐presidential	   system	   and	  cohabitation	  are	  problematic,	  then	  we	  would	  expect	  to	  observe	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  form	  of	  government	  in	  such	  a	  context.	  	  	   Second,	  Timor-­‐Leste	  has	  a	  semi-­‐presidential	  constitution.	  Academics	  often	  disagree	  whether	  countries	  should	  be	  classified	  as	  semi-­‐presidential.	  For	  example,	  the	   political	   system	   of	   Tunisia	   or	   Djibouti	   is	   not	   always	   considered	   semi-­‐presidential	  (Elgie,	  2007;	  Kirschke,	  2007).	  Similarly,	  no	  scholarly	  consensus	  exists	  about	   the	   nature	   of,	   for	   example,	   the	   system	   of	   Sri	   Lanka,	   Ireland,	   Iceland	   or	  Austria	   (Sartori,	   1994;	   Elgie,	   2007).	   The	   political	   regime	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste,	   by	  contrast,	  has	  not	  been	  subject	  of	  academic	  controversy	  and	  has	  been	  consistently	  
classified	  as	  semi-­‐presidential	  (Shoesmith,	  2003;	  Smith,	  2004;	  Feijó,	  2006;	  Leach,	  2006;	   Simonsen,	   2006;	   Shoesmith,	   2007;	   Vasconcelos	   and	   Cunha,	   2008;	   Reilly,	  2011).	  The	  constitution	  determines	  that	  the	  president	  and	  parliament	  are	  directly	  elected	   by	   the	   people	   and	   prescribes	   that	   the	   president	   and	   cabinet	   are	  accountable	  to	  the	  parliament.	  	  	   Thirdly,	   arguably,	   Timor-­‐Leste	   experienced	   a	   period	   of	   cohabitation	   from	  2002-­‐2006.	  The	  2001	  elections	  for	  a	  Constituent	  Assembly	  (CA)	  led	  to	  a	  landslide	  victory	   of	   the	   FRETILIN3	   party.	   Before	   the	   elections	   it	   was	   decided	   that	   the	   CA	  would	   officially	   turn	   into	   the	   first	   national	   parliament	   (UNTAET,	   2001).	   Marí	  Alkatiri,	   the	   leader	   of	   FRETILIN,	   was	   appointed	   as	   the	   first	   Prime	   Minister	   of	  Timor-­‐Leste.	   The	   cabinet	  was	  made	   up	   exclusively	   of	  members	   of	   FRETILIN.4	   In	  April	   2002	   José	   Alexandre	   Gusmão	   became	   president	   after	   winning	   the	   first	  presidential	   elections.	   The	   period	   from	   April	   2002	   to	   June	   2006	   when	   Alkatiri	  resigned	   can	   be	   considered	   a	   period	   of	   cohabitation.	   Elgie	   (2008;	   2011)	   will	  disagree	  with	  this	  classification	  because	  the	  president	  was	  not	  a	  party	  member	  and	  therefore	  was	  de	  jure	   independent.	  According	  to	  him,	  cohabitation	  cannot	  prevail	  in	   semi-­‐presidential	   democracies	   were	   the	   president	   is	   independent	   and	   non-­‐partisan.	  Elgie’s	  definition,	  however,	  presupposes	  a	  full-­‐fledged	  political	  society	  in	  which	  political	  demands	  are	  channelled	   through	  political	  parties.	   In	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  like	  in	  many	  other	  new	  democracies,	  political	  organisation	  lacked	  behind	  political	  participation	   in	   the	   form	   of	   elections	   (Huntington,	   1996).	   Indeed,	   the	   party	   of	  President	   Gusmão	   was	   only	   established	   after	   the	   presidential	   elections	   and	   the	  introduction	  of	   the	   semi-­‐presidential	   system.	   In	  other	  words,	  party	   affiliation,	   or	  non-­‐partisanship,	  should	  be	  regarded	  with	  some	  suspicion	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste.5	  	  
	   Here,	  though,	  following	  Shoesmith	  (2003;	  2007)	  who	  argued	  that	  this	  was	  a	  period	  of	  ‘conflictual	  cohabitation’	  	  (2007:	  229),	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  first	  government	   period	   was	   a	   situation	   of	   cohabitation	   for	   two	   reasons.	   In	   the	   first	  place,	   long	   before	   the	   introduction	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   semi-­‐presidential	   system,	  Gusmão	  and	  Alkatiri	  experienced	  serious	  difficulties	  working	  together.	  During	  the	  struggle	   against	   Indonesian	   occupation,	   conflict	   emerged	   between	   Gusmão	   and	  FRETILIN	   over	   leadership	   and	   the	   ideological	   foundation	   of	   the	   resistance	  movement.	   Gusmão	   wanted	   parties	   other	   than	   FRETILIN	   to	   become	   part	   of	   the	  independence	   struggle.	   However,	   his	   policy	   of	   national	   unity	   brought	   him	   into	  serious	   conflict	  with	   the	   FRETILIN	   leadership	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1980s.	   A	   similar	  dispute	  rose	  during	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  cabinet	  in	  April	  2002.	  President	  Gusmão	  suggested	   forming	   a	   “government	   of	   national	   unity”	   but	   the	   prime	  minister	   and	  secretary	   general	   of	   FRETILIN	  decided	  otherwise.	   "There	  will	   not	   be	   this	   sort	   of	  government,"	   Alkatiri	   said.	   "If	   there	  was	   one,	   I	  would	   not	   be	   in	   it."	   (Jolly,	   2002)	  True	   to	   his	   word,	   the	   prime	   minister	   appointed	   ministers	   from	   exclusively	  FRETILIN	  for	  his	  cabinet.	  	  	   A	   second	   reason	   to	   classify	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   first	   period	   as	   an	   example	   of	  cohabitation	   is	   that	   Gusmão’s	   was	   de	   facto	   partisan,	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   opposed	   to	  FRETILIN.	  Although	  in	  the	  presidential	  elections	  of	  2002	  he	  ran	  as	  an	  independent	  his	  candidature	  was	  publicly	  supported	  by	  virtually	  all	  political	  parties	  except	  for	  FRETILIN.	  Gusmão	  rejected	  the	  backing	  of	  the	  FRETILIN.	  The	  FRETILIN	  leadership,	  for	   its	   part,	   urged	   its	   members	   to	   vote	   for	   his	   opponent	   Francisco	   do	   Amaral	  (ASDT),	  or	  to	  cast	  blank	  votes.	  In	  addition,	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Alkatri	  government	  in	  2006	  Gusmão	  was	  quick	  to	  form	  a	  new	  party,	  the	  CNRT,	  which	  according	  to	  its	  founder,	   intended	   to	   "knock	   the	  FRETILIN	  party	  off	   its	  pedestal	   as	   the	  dominant	  
political	  force	  and	  remove	  its	  majority	  in	  the	  parliament"	  (Patterson,	  2007).	  These	  developments	   cast	   doubt	   on	   Gusmão’s	   claim	   to	   be	   a	   non-­‐partisan	   president	  situated	   above	   party	   politics.	   In	   sum,	   the	   political	   configuration	   that	   emerged	   in	  Timor-­‐Leste	   in	  2002	   can	   reasonably	  be	  designated	  as	   a	   situation	  of	   cohabitation	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons.6	  	  	  
Data	  Collection	  In	  order	  to	  find	  institutional	  conflict	  during	  cohabitation,	  I	  consulted	  the	  electronic	  database	  of	  LexisNexis,	  the	  database	  of	  the	  Portuguese	  news	  agency	  LUSA,	  online	  news	   services	   and	   archives	   of	   the	   East	   Timor	   Action	   Network	   (ETAN)	   and	   the	  Asian	   Pacific	   Solidarity	   Network	   (APSN),	   as	   well	   as	   books	   and	   parliamentary	  reports.	   In	   the	  LexisNexis	  electronic	  databases,	   the	   following	  terms	  were	  used	  to	  search	   for	   institutional	   conflict.	   First,	   I	   introduced	   the	   terms	   “Timor”,	   “Gusmão”	  and	  “Alkatiri”	   for	  the	  period	  20	  May	  2002	  to	  26	  June	  2006.	  On	  20	  May	  2002,	   the	  constitution	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste	  went	   into	   force	  and	  on	  26	   June	  2006	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	   resigned.	   Second,	   I	   used	   the	   terms	   “Gusmão”	   and	   “parliament”	   or	  “legislature”	  to	  find	  conflict	  between	  the	  president	  and	  the	  parliamentary	  majority.	  I	  also	  consulted	  the	  database	  of	  LUSA	  to	  find	  inter-­‐	  and	  intra-­‐institutional	  conflict	  under	  the	  three	  situations.	  To	  do	  so,	  I	  translated	  the	  search	  terms	  into	  Portuguese.	  	   The	  East	  Timor	  and	  Indonesia	  Action	  Network	  (ETAN)	  and	  the	  Asia	  Pacific	  Solidarity	   Network	   (APSN)	   are	   NGO	   websites.	   Both	   sites	   contain	   an	   extensive	  archive	   with	   both	   national	   and	   international	   news	   reports,	   articles	   and	   press	  releases	  on	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  This	   archive	   also	   includes	  news	   reports	   that	  have	  been	  broadcast	  on	  radio	  and	  national	  television.	  I	  read	  all	  material	  archived	  between	  20	  May	   2002	   and	   26	   June	   2006	   from	   principally	   the	   ETAN	   site.	   Other	   sites	   that	   I	  
consulted	   were	   the	   “Judicial	   System	   Monitoring	   Programme	   (JSMP)”	   site	   and	  “Jornal	  da	  República”,	  the	  online	  government	  gazette	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  	   I	  also	  used	  parliamentary	  reports	  on	  the	  legislative	  process	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  to	   identify	   incidences	  of	  conflicts	  over	   legislation.	  These	  reports	  were	  sent	   to	  me	  by	   the	  UNDP	  and	   include	   information	  about	   the	  date	  and	   type	  of	  draft	   laws	   that	  were	  vetoed	  by	  the	  president.	  In	  addition,	  I	  collected	  and	  analysed	  all	  presidential	  speeches	   of	   Gusmão	   from	   May	   2002	   to	   June	   2006.	   The	   presidential	   discourses	  form	   an	   important	   source	   of	   information	   for	   the	   president	   often	   used	   public	  speeches	  to	  criticise	  government	  and	  its	  policy.	  	  	  THE	  FINDINGS	  	  This	  section	  identifies	  evidence	  of	  conflict	  between	  the	  president	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  cabinet	  and	  parliamentary	  majority	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  The	  first	  hypothesis	  (H1)	   predicts	   presidential	   activism	   in	   the	   area	   of	   legislation	   and	   in	   the	  appointment	  and	  dismissal	  process.	  The	  presidential	  sanctions	  are	  subdivided	  into	  legislative	  sanctions	  and	  sanctions	  in	  the	  appointment	  and	  dismissal	  process.	  The	  second	   hypothesis	   (H2)	   predicts	   parliamentary	   activism	   aiming	   to	   limit	  presidential	   influence	   in	   the	   legislative	   domain.	   These	   conflicts	   are	   termed	  parliamentary	   sanctions.	   The	   last	   hypothesis	   (H3)	   expects	   institutional	   conflict	  over	  security	  and	  defence	  matters.	  	  
	  
	  
Presidential	  Legislative	  Sanctions	  During	  the	  period	  of	  cohabitation,	  President	  Gusmão	  issued	  four	  vetoes,	  sent	  three	  statutes	   to	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   four	   constitutional	   review	   and	   issued	   one	  presidential	   decree.	   In	   addition,	   the	   president	   used	   “soft	   sanctions”	   when	   he	  delayed	  the	  promulgation	  of	  statutes	  and	  he	  also	  used	  a	  “veto	  threat”.	  	  	   Given	  that	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  highest	  court	  –	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  –	  only	  started	  to	   function	   in	   June	   2003,	   the	   president	   could	   neither	   submit	   legislation	   to	   the	  Court	  for	  constitutional	  review	  nor	  issue	  a	  constitutional	  veto	  during	  the	  first	  year	  after	   independence	   (Judicial	   System	   Monitoring	   Programme,	   2003).	   However,	  soon	   after	   it	   became	  operational,	   in	   June	  2003,	   President	  Gusmão	   submitted	   the	  first	  draft	  Law	  on	  Immigration	  and	  Asylum	  to	  the	  Court	  for	  constitutional	  review.7	  In	  addition,	   the	  Freedom	  of	  Assembly	  and	  Demonstration	  Law	  and	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  Penal	   Code	  were	   sent	   to	   the	   Court	   in	   2005	   and	   in	   2006	   respectively.8	   President	  Gusmão	   also	   vetoed	   the	   Immigration	   and	   Asylum	   Law	   and	   the	   Freedom	   of	  Assembly	   and	   Demonstration	   Law	   after	   the	   Court	   ruled	   that	   both	   laws	   were	  unconstitutional.	   The	   Court	   decided	   that	   the	   Timor-­‐Leste	   Penal	   Code	   was	  consistent	   with	   the	   constitution.	   However,	   the	   president	   neither	   signed	   nor	  promulgated	   the	   law	   and	   thus	   effectively	   used	   a	   pocket	   veto	   (Vasconcelos	   and	  Cunha,	  2009:	  239,	  fn.	  12).	  Eventually,	  the	  Penal	  Code	  was	  signed	  and	  promulgated	  by	   President	   José	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   in	   April	   2009.	   The	   president	   also	   vetoed	   the	  Revenue	  System	  Amendment	  Law	  on	  political	  grounds.9	  Under	   cohabitation,	   the	   president	   did	   not	   call	   for	   a	   referendum.	   An	  important	   reason	   that	   he	   refrained	   from	  doing	   so	  was	  based	  on	   the	   fact	   that	   no	  organic	  law	  was	  passed	  to	  regulate	  the	  holding	  of	  a	  referendum	  (Feijó,	  2006).	  So,	  
the	   absence	   of	   an	   organic	   law	   on	   the	   regulation	   of	   a	   referendum	   deprived	   the	  president	  from	  submitting	  issues	  of	  national	  interest	  to	  a	  referendum.	  	  The	  fourth	  observable	  implication	  of	  conflict	  in	  the	  legislative	  domain	  is	  the	  use	  of	  presidential	  decrees.	  From	  May	  2002	  to	  March	  2005	  the	  president	  could	  not	  declare	  a	  state	  of	  siege	  or	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  by	  presidential	  decree	  due	  to	  the	  absence	   of	   necessary	   legislation.	   The	   constitution	   states	   that	   the	   president	   is	  empowered	   to	   declare	   a	   state	   of	   siege	   or	   a	   state	   of	   emergency	   following	  authorisation	   of	   the	   national	   parliament,	   after	   consultation	   with	   the	   Council	   of	  State,	  the	  government,	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Council	  of	  Defence	  and	  Security	  (Section	  85g).10	  However,	  President	  Gusmão	  could	  not	  seek	  advice	  from	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  and	   the	   Supreme	   Council	   of	   Defence	   and	   Security	   because	   neither	   consultative	  institution	   was	   established	   until	   March	   2005.11	   So,	   in	   case	   of	   aggression	   by	   a	  foreign	  force	  or	  (the	  threat	  of)	  serious	  disturbance	  to	  the	  democratic	  constitutional	  order	  or	  of	  public	  disaster	  the	  president	  was	  institutionally	  barred	  from	  calling	  on	  the	   army	   to	   restore	   internal	   security	   (Section	   25).	   However,	   in	   May	   2006	   the	  president	   invoked	  a	  state	  of	   “emergency”	  by	  presidential	  decree.12	  The	  president	  assumed	   full	   executive	   and	   legislative	   power	   thereby	   effectively	   sidelining	   the	  cabinet	   and	   parliamentary	  majority.	   It	   is	   open	   to	   question	   whether	   the	   act	   was	  constitutional	  given	  that	  the	  declaration	  needed	  to	  have	  prior	  endorsement	  of	  the	  parliamentary	   majority	   (Section	   85g).	   The	   parliament	   only	   approved	   the	  emergency	  decree	  a	  week	  after	  it	  was	  issued.	  In	   addition	   to	   formal	   sanctions,	   President	   Gusmão	   used	   “soft	   sanctions”	  against	  the	  cabinet	  and	  parliamentary	  majority	  when	  he	  delayed	  the	  promulgation	  of	  statutes	  and	  used	  a	  veto	  threat.	  These	  sanctions	  indicate	  conflict	  but	  do	  not	  have	  the	   same	   political	   leverage	   on	   the	   legislative	   process	   as	   formal	   sanctions.	   The	  
president	   frequently	   delayed	   the	   promulgation	   of	   laws	   beyond	   the	   time	   period	  stipulated	   in	   the	   constitution.	   Under	   the	   constitution	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste,	   it	   is	  incumbent	   on	   the	   President	   of	   the	   Republic	   to	   promulgate	   all	   statutes	   (Section	  85a).	  The	  constitution	  states	  that	  the	  president	  must	  promulgate	  a	  law	  presented	  by	  the	  parliament	  (proposta	  de	  lei)	  within	  30	  days	  whereas	  a	  law	  presented	  by	  the	  government	   (projeto	   de	   lei)	   should	   be	   promulgated	  within	   40	   days	   (Section	   88).	  Considerable	   delay	   in	   the	   promulgation	   of	   legislation	   indicates	   conflict	   between	  president	  and	  the	  other	  two	  institution.	  Here,	  delay	  is	  viewed	  as	  “considerable”	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  president	  promulgates	  (or	  vetoes)	  a	  statute	  outside	  the	  timeframe	  stipulated	  in	  the	  constitution.	  Out	  of	  a	  total	  of	  122	  laws	  no	  fewer	  than	  45	  draft	  laws	  were	  promulgated	  beyond	  the	  period	  provided	  by	  the	  Constitution	  (Ministério	  da	  Justiça,	   2011).	   In	   other	  words,	   around	   37	   per	   cent	   of	   all	   draft	   laws	   experienced	  considerable	   delay.	   Draft	   legislation	   introduced	   by	   the	   government	   was	   a	  particular	   target	   of	   this	   sanction:	   the	   president	   held	   up	   54	   per	   cent	   of	   all	  government	  laws	  compared	  to	  15	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  laws	  introduced	  by	  the	  parliament	  (Ministério	  da	  Justiça,	  2011).	  In	  addition,	  President	  Gusmão	  used	  a	  “veto	   threat”	   (Wilson,	  2005).	   In	   July	  2005,	   President	   Gusmão	   threatened	   to	   veto	   the	   so-­‐called	   “Treaty	   on	   Certain	  Maritime	  Arrangements	   in	   the	  Timor	  Sea“	  (CMATS)	   that	  would	  establish	  a	  50-­‐50	  split	  of	  royalties	   from	  the	  Greater	  Sunrise	  gas	   field	   in	  the	  Timor	  Sea.13	  Under	  the	  treaty,	   Australia	   would	   pay	   Timor-­‐Leste	   $US13.9	   billion	   in	   exchange	   for	  postponing	  talks	  on	  the	  maritime	  boundary	  between	  the	  countries	  for	  the	  next	  50	  years.	  According	  to	  media	  sources,	  President	  Gusmão	  remained	  unconvinced	  that	  Timor-­‐Leste	   should	   give	   up	   its	   sovereignty	   over	   gas	   reserves	   the	   U.N.	   believed	  conservatively	   to	   be	   worth	   more	   than	   $US30	   billion.	   In	   the	   president’s	   annual	  
address	   to	   the	   national	   parliament	   the	   government	   was	   accused	   of	   backroom	  politics	   and	   shady	   deals	   with	   Australia.	   Gusmão	   notified	   the	   deputies	   that	  “questions	   arise	   around	   the	   term	   ‘creative	   solutions’	   (quotation	   marks	   in	   the	  original)	  expressed	  by	  the	  prime	  minister,	  and	  that	  doubts	  persist	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  people	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  meeting	  between	  foreign	  minister	  José	  Ramos-­‐Horta	  and	  his	  Australian	  counterpart,	  when	  they	  spoke	  of	  an	  ‘open	  window’	  and	  of	  ‘Christmas	  gifts”	  (Gusmão,	  2004).	  	  	  
Presidential	  Sanctions	  in	  the	  Appointment	  and	  Dismissal	  Process	  Conflict	  between	  President	  Gusmão	  on	  one	  side,	  and	  the	  cabinet	  and	  parliamentary	  majority	   on	   the	   other	   side,	   disrupted	   the	   appointment	   and	   dismissal	   process	   as	  well.	   Even	   before	   the	   constitution	   formally	   came	   into	   effect,	   in	   April	   2002,	   a	  dispute	   rose	   between	   the	   president	   and	   prime	  minister	   over	   the	   composition	   of	  the	  cabinet.	  President	  Gusmão	  suggested	  forming	  a	  government	  of	  national	  unity,	  a	  coalition	  of	  six	  political	  parties,	  but	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  refused.	  "There	  will	  not	  be	  this	  sort	  of	  government,"	  Alkatiri	  said,	  "if	   there	  was	  one,	   I	  would	  not	  be	   in	   it."	  (Jolly,	  2002).	  The	  prime	  minister	  added	  that	  if	  the	  president	  wanted	  a	  government	  of	   national	   unity,	   he	   should	   look	   at	   the	   constitution	   (Associated	   Press	  Worldstream,	  2002).	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  appointed	  ministers	  from	  exclusively	  FRETILIN.	  	   During	   the	   first	   three	   years	   after	   independence,	   President	   Gusmão	   could	  not	   dismiss	   the	   prime	   minister	   due	   to	   the	   absence	   of	   the	   necessary	   legislation.	  Under	   the	   constitution,	   the	   president	   is	   constitutionally	   obliged	   to	   seek	   advice	  from	   the	   Council	   of	   State	   before	   removing	   the	   prime	  minister.	   The	   constitution	  further	  stipulates	  that	  the	  president	  shall	  only	  dismiss	  the	  prime	  minister	  when	  it	  
is	   deemed	   necessary	   to	   ensure	   the	   regular	   functioning	   of	   the	   democratic	  institutions,	   after	   consultation	  with	   the	   Council	   of	   State	   (Section	   112).	  However,	  between	   May	   2002	   and	   February	   2005	   this	   consultative	   body	   only	   existed	   on	  paper.	  Indeed,	  only	  in	  2005	  the	  parliament	  passed	  legislation	  that	  established	  the	  legal	   framework	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   State.14	   So,	   for	   some	   time	   in	   the	   period	   2002-­‐2006,	   the	  president	  could	  not	  dismiss	   the	  prime	  minister	   for	   the	  reason	   that	   the	  Council	   of	   State	  did	  not	   exist	   and,	   hence,	   could	  not	  be	   consulted.	  With	   regard	   to	  government	   members,	   the	   president	   was	   not	   permitted	   to	   unilaterally	   dismiss	  cabinet	  ministers.	  Under	   the	   constitution,	   the	  president	   can	  only	  dismiss	   cabinet	  ministers	   following	   a	   proposal	   by	   the	   prime	   minister	   (Section	   86h).	   However,	  President	  was	  very	  displeased	  about	  the	  nomination	  and	  performance	  of	  Interior	  Minister	   Rogério	   Lobato.	   So,	   President	   Gusmão	   sought	   alternative	   ways	   to	   get	  Lobato	   fired,	  which	  brought	  him	   into	  serious	  conflict	  with	   the	  prime	  minister.	   In	  no	  fewer	  than	  eight	  formal	  speeches	  addressed	  either	  to	  the	  national	  parliament	  or	  to	   the	   nation	   President	   Gusmão	   criticised	   Lobato,	   and	   in	   particular	   his	   policy	  regarding	   the	   establishment	   and	   development	   of	   the	   Timorese	   police	   force	  (PNTL15).	   	  For	  example,	   in	  one	  of	  his	   first	  official	   speeches	   to	   the	  nation	  Gusmão	  accused	   Interior	   Minister	   Lobato	   of	   demagoguery	   and	   reproached	   him	   for	  “exploiting	   the	   failures	   of	   the	   state’s	   institutions	   to	   mobilise	   the	   population”	  (Gusmão,	  2005:	  17).	  	  Tension	  grew	  between	  the	  president	  and	  the	  prime	  minister	  when,	   in	  November	  2002,	  President	  Gusmão	  publicly	  ordered	  the	  prime	  minister	  to	  dismiss	  the	  Minister	  of	  Interior	  (Gusmão,	  2002).	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  refused	  to	   do	   so.	   Prime	   Minister	   Alkatiri	   stated:	   “I	   will	   be	   the	   one	   to	   dismiss	   those	  incapable	   of	   doing	   their	   duties.	   It	   doesn't	   have	   to	   come	   from	   the	   president's	  speech”	   (Asia	   Pacific	   Solidarity	   Network,	   2002).	   When	   in	   May	   2006,	   violence	  
erupted	   between	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   police	   and	   armed	   forces,	   President	   Gusmão	  ordered	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  to	  dismiss	  Interior	  Minister	  Lobato,	  this	  time	  together	  with	   Defence	   Minister	   Roque	   Rodrigues.	   Both	   ministers	   resigned	   in	   June	   2006,	  after	   intense	   pressure	   from	   President	   Gusmão	   (Murdoch	   and	   Allard,	   2006).	  However,	  according	  to	  President	  Gusmão,	  the	  removal	  of	  both	  ministers	  did	  not	  go	  far	   enough	   to	   put	   an	   end	   to	   the	   festering	   conflicts	   in	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   security	  apparatus.	  In	  his	  speech	  to	  the	  national	  parliament	  Gusmão	  declared	  that	  the	  state	  was	  incapable	  and	  unwilling	  to	  resolve	  the	  problems.	  “We	  have	  witnessed	  the	  State	  become	   paralysed	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   all	   the	   events	   that	   took	   place	   in	   Dili”.	   (…)	   “In	  politics,	   the	  non-­‐recognition	  of	  a	  mistake,	  even	   if	   it	   is	  a	   small	  one,	   can	   lead	  us	   to	  make	   greater	   mistakes”	   (Gusmão,	   2006a).	   On	   20	   June	   2002,	   in	   a	   nationally	  televised	  speech,	  President	  Gusmão	  threatened	  to	  resign	  if	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  refused	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  President	  gave	  FRETILIN	  an	  ultimatum	  to	  either	  ask	  Alkatiri	  to	  resign	  immediately	  and	  take	  responsibility	  for	  the	  current	  political	  crisis	  or	  he	  would	  tender	  his	  resignation	  to	  parliament	  (UNOTIL	  Daily	  Media	  Review,	  2006e).	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  resigned	  on	  26	  June	  2002.	  The	   third	   observable	   implication	   of	   conflict	   over	   the	   appointment	   or	  dismissal	  of	  officials	  between	  the	  president	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  cabinet	  and	  parliamentary	  majority	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  involves	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  national	  parliament.	  There	  again,	   though,	   the	  president	   could	  not	  dissolve	   the	  parliament	  due	   to	   legislative	  voids.	  The	  constitution	  empowers	   the	  president	   to	  dissolve	   the	  national	   parliament	   “in	   case	   of	   a	   serious	   institutional	   crisis	   preventing	   the	  formation	  of	   a	   government	  or	   the	   approval	   of	   the	   state	  budget	   and	   lasting	  more	  than	   sixty	   days,	   after	   consultation	  with	   political	   parties	   sitting	   in	   the	   parliament	  
and	  with	  the	  Council	  of	  State”	  (Section	  86f).	  As	  stated	  earlier,	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  was	  only	  established	  in	  May	  2005.16	  The	   fourth	   observable	   implication	   of	   institutional	   conflict	   in	   the	  appointment	   and	  dismissal	   process	  manifested	   itself	   in	   disagreements	   about	   the	  appointment	   of	   government	   officials	   in	   the	   area	   of	   external	   affairs.	   	   President	  Gusmão	   refused	   to	   appoint	   the	   prime	   minister’s	   candidate	   for	   the	   post	   of	  ambassador	  to	  Australia.	  The	  constitution	  empowers	  the	  government	  to	  propose	  a	  nominee	   (Section	  115).	   The	  president	   appoints	   or	   rejects	   the	  nominee	   following	  the	  proposal	  of	  the	  government	  (Section	  87b).	  Abel	  Guterres	  was	  the	  first	  choice	  of	  the	  president	  but	  his	  candidacy	  was	  vetoed	  in	  July	  2002	  by	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  who	  backed	  Antoninho	  Bianco	  (Jolliffe,	  2002).	  In	  an	  interview	  on	  13	  June	  2002,	  the	  prime	   minister	   was	   adamant	   that	   Bianco	   had	   been	   nominated,	   a	   statement	  confirmed	   by	   Bianco.	   Confronted	   with	   this	   declaration,	   Ramos-­‐Horta	   said	   the	  appointment	  could	  not	  be	  presented	  "as	  a	  fait	  accompli",	  stressing	  that	  the	  final	  say	  rested	   with	   President	   Gusmão	   who	   had	   to	   approve	   diplomatic	   appointments	  (Jolliffe,	   2002).	   Eventually,	   in	   March	   2003,	   a	   third	   candidate,	   Jorge	   Teme,	   was	  appointed	  ambassador	  (Jolliffe,	  2003).	  All	  in	  all,	  Timor-­‐Leste	  was	  unrepresented	  in	  Australia	  for	  almost	  a	  year	  due	  to	  the	  tug-­‐of	  war	  between	  the	  President	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  over	  the	  nomination	  of	  an	  ambassador	  to	  Canberra.	  	  
Parliamentary	  Sanctions	  The	   second	   hypothesis	   (H2)	   predicts	   parliamentary	   activism	   aiming	   to	   limit	  presidential	  influence	  in	  the	  legislative	  domain.	  The	  first	  observable	  implication	  of	  a	  problematic	  relationship	  between	  the	  parliamentary	  majority	  and	  the	  president	  is	   when	   the	   parliament	   rejects	   and	   overrides	   a	   presidential	   veto.	   Under	  
cohabitation,	   the	   parliament	   overrode	   all	   presidential	   vetoes,	   including	   the	  Immigration	  and	  Asylum	  Law,	   the	  Freedom	  of	  Assembly	  and	  Demonstration	  Law	  and	  the	  Penal	  Code.	  The	  parliament	  even	  ignored	  the	  ruling	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  and	   adopted	   the	   Immigration	   and	   Asylum	   Law	   that	   had	   been	   declared	  unconstitutional.	  	  	   With	  regard	  to	  presidential	  decrees,	  the	  parliament	  rejected	  a	  presidential	  decree	  nominating	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  on	  10	  March	  2003.17	  This	  parliamentary	   act	   delayed	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   from	   becoming	   operational.	   The	  parliament	  finally	  ratified	  the	  presidential	  decree	  on	  22	  April	  2003.18	  In	  addition,	  some	   FRETILIN	   deputies	   doubted	   whether	   to	   approve	   the	   parliamentary	  resolution	  that	  would	  enable	  President	  Gusmão	  to	  make	  a	  state	  visit	  to	  Indonesia	  in	  February	  2006	  (UNOTIL	  Daily	  Media	  Review,	  2006d).	  	   The	  final	  observable	  implication	  of	  conflict	  might	  be	  termed	  parliamentary	  obstructionism.	   The	   parliamentary	   majority	   refrained	   from	   preparing	   laws	   that	  would	   have	   authorised	   the	   president	   to	   fully	   exercise	   his	   constitutional	  competencies	   (Feijó,	   2006).	   The	   constitution	   determines	   that	   in	   several	   areas	  presidential	   decisions	   need	   to	   be	   preceded	   by	   consultation	   with	   the	   Council	   of	  State	  and/or	  with	  the	  Superior	  Council	  for	  Defence	  and	  Security.	  Only	  in	  2005	  the	  parliament	   passed	   legislation	   that	   established	   the	   legal	   framework	   of	   both	  organs.19	  So,	  from	  2002	  to	  2005	  the	  president	  could	  not	  declare	  a	  state	  of	  siege	  or	  a	  state	  of	  emergency,	  declare	  war	  or	  make	  peace	  with	  a	  foreign	  country	  or	  call	  for	  a	  referendum.	   Similarly,	   the	   president	   was	   deprived	   of	   the	   power	   to	   dismiss	   the	  prime	   minister	   or	   to	   dissolve	   the	   parliament.	   These	   legal	   voids	   deprived	   the	  president	   ipso	  facto	  of	  several	   important	  powers	  that	  would	  have	  allowed	  him	  to	  oversee	  the	  legislature.	   	  
Conflicts	  over	  Defence	  and	  National	  Security	  The	   last	  hypothesis	   (H3)	  predicts	   institutional	   conflict	  over	   security	  and	  defence	  policy.	  In	  early	  2006	  President	  Gusmão	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  cabinet	  and	  high	  command	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  differed	  over	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  internal	  dissent	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  army.	  	  In	   January	   2006,	   a	   group	   of	   159	   F-­‐FDTL20	   soldiers	   submitted	   a	   written	  petition	  to	  President	  Gusmão	  and	  the	  Defence	  Force	  Commander	  Brigadier	  General	  Taur	  Matan	   Ruak	   complaining	   of	   discrimination	   in	   the	   defence	   force	   by	   officers	  from	   the	   eastern	   part	   of	   the	   country	   (lorosae)	   against	   people	   from	   the	   west	  (loromonu).	   According	   to	   them,	   western	   soldiers	   were	   treated	   unfairly	   in	  recruitment	   procedures,	   promotions	   and	   disciplinary	  measures.	   The	   disgruntled	  soldiers,	  however,	  declined	  to	  send	  a	  copy	  to	  the	  prime	  minister.	  	  Early	  February	  2002,	  Defence	  Force	  Commander	  Ruak	  called	  for	  a	  meeting	  with	  soldiers	  and	  sergeants	  to	  discuss	  the	  petition	  but	  when	  the	  issue	  was	  raised	  some	  of	  the	  soldiers	  said	  it	  was	  a	  matter	  that	  only	  the	  president	  had	  the	  power	  to	  resolve	   (UNOTIL,	   2006b).	   The	   president	   decided	   then	   to	   meet	   the	   petitioners	  against	   commander	   Ruak’s	   will.	   Ruak	   believed	   the	   president	   was	   ill-­‐advised	  because	   the	   meeting	   would	   further	   politicise	   the	   problem,	   moving	   it	   beyond	   a	  disciplinary	  issue	  in	  the	  armed	  forces	  and	  bringing	  more	  petitioners	  into	  the	  group	  (ICG,	  2006).	  	  By	   the	   end	  of	   February	  2006,	   the	  number	  of	   protestors	  had	   risen	   to	  591.	  Some	   of	   the	   soldiers	   had	   decided	   to	   leave	   their	   barracks	   and	   refused	   to	   return,	  despite	  repeated	  calls	  of	   the	  president	  and	  the	  Defence	  Force	  Commander.	  When	  the	  president	  asked	  the	  government	  to	  resolve	  the	  problem	  the	  prime	  minister	  had	  bluntly	   refused.	   He	   noted	   that	   the	   petition	   was	   addressed	   to	   almost	   everybody	  
except	   for	   the	  prime	  minister	  and	  stated:	   "If	   they	  have	   forgotten	  me,	   I	  cannot	  do	  anything.”	  “Let	  them	  keep	  forgetting	  me,"	  added	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  (UNOTIL,	  2006a).	  	  In	   March	   2006	   Defence	   Force	   Commander	   Ruak	   dismissed	   the	   591	  “petitioners”.	  The	  soldiers	  refused	   to	  return	   to	   their	  head	  quarters	  and	  therefore	  had	   abandoned	   their	   post.	   Prime	   Minister	   Alkatiri	   and	   Defence	   Minister	   Roque	  Rodrigues	   supported	   the	   defence	   commander’s	   decision	   but	   President	   Gusmão	  was	   strongly	   opposed.	   In	   a	   nation-­‐wide	   speech	   Gusmão	   declared	   that	   Ruak’s	  decision	   to	   expel	   almost	   600	   soldiers	   was	   “erroneous	   and	   unjust”	   (Gusmão,	  2006b).	  In	  addition,	  the	  president	  criticised	  the	  defence	  minister	  and	  the	  defence	  force	   commander	   for	   being	   unable	   or	   unwilling	   to	   solve	   the	   problem	   and	   he	  urgently	   asked	   them	   to	   change	   their	   policy	   towards	   the	   petitioners	   and	   to	  “carefully	   consider”	   the	   option	   to	   re-­‐accept	   the	   ex-­‐F-­‐FDTL	   soldiers	   “in	   order	   to	  resolve	   the	   matter	   accordingly”	   (Gusmão,	   2006b).	   Prime	   Minister	   Alkatiri	  expressed	  his	  discontent	  with	  the	  president’s	  stance	  on	  the	  issue	  and	  declared	  that	  “the	  decision	  came	  from	  the	  commander	  of	  F-­‐FDTL,	  following	  consultation	  with	  me	  and	  I	  agreed	  and	  fully	  support	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  commander	  who	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  make	  that	  decision”	  (UNOTIL	  Daily	  Media	  Review,	  2006a).	  	  In	  April	  2006	  President	  Gusmão	  declared	  in	  a	  conference	  that	  the	  country’s	  military	  leadership	  was	  in	  crisis	  (UNOTIL	  Daily	  Media	  Review,	  2006c).	  Against	  the	  background	   of	   growing	   tensions	   and	   anti-­‐government	   demonstrations	   in	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   capital,	   Dili,	   Prime	   Minister	   Alkatiri	   proposed	   to	   set	   up	   a	   government	  commission	   to	   look	   into	   the	   petitioners’	   complaints	   (Independent	   Special	  Commission	   of	   Inquiry	   for	   Timor-­‐Leste,	   2006).	   In	   addition,	   the	   Foreign	  Minister	  was	   nominated	   to	   talk	  with	   the	   protestors	   to	   put	   an	   end	   to	   the	   demonstrations.	  
However,	   these	   measures	   proved	   too	   little	   too	   late.	   The	   demonstration	   turned	  violent	   and	   the	   police	   did	   not	   control	   the	   situation.	   In	   an	   attempt	   to	   restore	  stability	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  called	  for	  the	  army	  to	  intervene.	  During	  the	  April	  2006	   riots	   five	   people	   were	   killed	   and	   more	   than	   one	   hundred	   houses	   were	  destroyed	   (ICG,	   2006).	   Some	   15,000	   persons	   sought	   refuge	   in	   churches,	   public	  buildings	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  facilities	  in	  Dili,	  while	  others	  left	  for	  the	  districts.	  Despite	  several	  calls	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  to	  leaders	  of	  the	  petitioners	  to	  come	  to	   Dili	   in	   order	   to	   resolve	   the	   problem,	   their	   main	   leader,	   Lieutenant	   Gastão	  Salsinha,	   declared	   that	   he	   would	   talk	   only	   to	   Gusmão	   “because	   I	   only	   trust	  President	  Xanana	  [Gusmão]	  since	  he	  is	  our	  Supreme	  Commander”	  (UNOTIL	  Daily	  Media	  Review,	  2006b).	  	  In	  late	  May	  2006	  in	  clashes	  between	  the	  police	  and	  the	  army	  ten	  unarmed	  policemen	   were	   killed	   and	   another	   27	   were	   wounded.	   In	   response	   to	   the	   riots,	  President	   Gusmão	   assumed	   full	   executive	   authority	   and	   invoked	   emergency	  powers	  to	  resolve	  the	  political	  crisis.	  The	  violence	  between	  Timor-­‐Leste’s	  security	  forces	  prompted	  President	  Gusmão	  to	  ask	   for	   foreign	   intervention	  to	  restore	   law	  and	   order.	   However,	   the	   decision	   brought	   them	   into	   conflict	   with	   the	   Prime	  Minister	   who	   argued	   furiously	   with	   President	   Gusmão	   against	   the	   request	   for	  foreign	   troops	   (Dodd,	   2006).	   The	  President	  won	   out,	   and	   a	   formal	   appeal	   –	   that	  Alkatiri	   reluctantly	   signed	   –	   was	   sent	   to	   Australia,	   Portugal,	   Malaysia	   and	   New	  Zealand.	  Under	  pressure	  of	  President	  Gusmão,	  Defence	  Minister	  Roque	  Rodrigues	  and	  Interior	  Minister	  Lobato	  resigned.	  Some	  weeks	  later,	  the	  President	  pressured	  the	   Prime	   Minister	   into	   resigning.	   In	   a	   nationally	   televised	   speech	   President	  Gusmão	  threatened	  to	  step	  down	  if	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  refused	  to	  do	  so.	  One	  week	  later,	  on	  26	  June,	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  resigned	  as	  well.	  	  
CONCLUSION	  	  There	   is	   an	   ongoing	   debate	   about	   the	   potential	   danger	   of	   cohabitation	   for	   new	  democracies.	   Until	   recently,	   cohabitation	  was	   considered	   to	   be	   the	  main	   peril	   of	  semi-­‐presidential	   systems.	   Scholars	   warned	   that	   cohabitation	   may	   cause	   intra-­‐executive	   conflict	   that	   could	   lead	   to	   democratic	   breakdown	   (Linz,	   1994;	   Stepan	  and	  Suleiman,	  1995;	  Kirschke,	  2007).	  Linz	  (1994)	  emphasised	  the	  danger	  of	  intra-­‐executive	   conflict	   over	   defence	   policy	   which	   could	   lead	   to	   a	   coup	   d’état.	  	   However,	   in	   the	   past	   few	   years,	   comparative	   politics	   scholars	   have	  questioned	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  cohabitation	  (Elgie,	  2008;	  Elgie	  and	  McMenamin,	  2011).	   According	   to	   Elgie	   (2008),	   only	   in	   Niger	   cohabitation	   was	   directly	  responsible	   for	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   democratic	   regime.	   Based	   on	   a	   statistical	  analysis,	  Elgie	  and	  McMenamin	  (2011)	  claimed	  that	  cohabitation	  is	  more	  prevalent	  in	  relatively	  stable	  democracies	  that	  are	  able	  to	  regulate	  conflict	  and,	  therefore,	  do	  not	  collapse.	  They	  concluded	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  cohabitation	  is	  less	  serious	  than	  the	   literature	   suggests	   (Elgie	   and	   McMenamin,	   2011:	   18).	   In	   short,	   there	   is	   no	  academic	   consensus	   on	   whether	   cohabitation	   is	   unequivocally	   dangerous	   for	   a	  new	  democracy.	  	   This	  paper	  has	  examined	  the	  effects	  of	  cohabitation	  in	  a	  new	  democracy.	  It	  has	  found	  that	  cohabitation	  encouraged	  tension	  between	  President	  Gusmão	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  cabinet	  and	  the	  parliamentary	  majority	  on	  the	  other.	  Moreover,	  due	   to	   the	   absence	   of	   enabling	   legislation,	   President	   Gusmão	   was	   deprived	   of	  several	   powers	   of	   oversight.	   In	   other	   words,	   there	   may	   have	   been	   more	  institutional	   conflict	   had	   the	   correct	   legislation	   been	   in	   place.	   Hence,	   quite	  
possibly,	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   post-­‐conflict	   context	   had	   a	   dampening	   effect	   on	  institutional	  conflict.	  	  	   This	   paper	   has	   also	   demonstrated	   that	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   armed	   forces	  threatened	  government	  stability	  under	  cohabitation.	  Disagreements	  over	  defence	  policy	  between	  Gusmão	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  cabinet	  and	  high	  command	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  hindered	  a	  quick	  response	  to	  dissent	  within	   the	  Timorese	   army.	   The	   situation	   escalated	   when	   a	   substantial	   part	   of	   the	   military	  intervened	  in	  political	  affairs	  and	  demanded	  the	  resignation	  of	  the	  prime	  minister.	  Institutional	   conflict	   over	   security	   matters	   can	   partly	   be	   ascribed	   to	   the	  constitution	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste.	   The	   constitution	   determines	   that	   the	   government	   is	  responsible	   for	   internal	   security	   and	   shares	   responsibility	   with	   the	   president	  regarding	   issues	   related	   to	   the	   country’s	   external	   security.	   Internal	   conflict,	  therefore,	   requires	   a	   close	   co-­‐operation	   between	   the	   president	   and	   the	   prime	  minister.	   For	   one	   thing,	   the	   head	   of	   state	   can	   only	   declare	   a	   state	   of	   emergency	  after	   he	   or	   she	   has	   been	   given	   permission	   by	   the	   national	   parliament	   of	   Timor-­‐Leste.	   Cohabitation	   potentially	   hinders	   close	   cooperation	   between	   the	   president	  and	  cabinet.	  	  	   All	   things	   said,	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   is	   another	   example	   of	   the	   danger	   of	  cohabitation	   in	   new	   semi-­‐presidential	   democracies	   outside	   Europe.	   However,	  caution	   should	   be	   exercised	   when	   drawing	   conclusions	   from	   a	   single	   country	  study.	   For	   one,	   eighteen	   months	   of	   cohabitation	   led	   to	   a	   collapse	   of	   Niger’s	  democratic	   regime	   whereas	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   democracy	   survived	   four	   years	   of	  cohabitation.	  Even	   so,	   cohabitation	  generated	   the	  kind	  of	   conflicts	   that	   in	   theory	  was	   predicted.	   According	   to	   Shugart	   and	   Carey	   “democratic	   institutions	   are	  supposed	  to	  be	  conflict	  regulators,	  not	  conflict	  generators”	  (1992:	  165-­‐166).	  This	  
paper	   has	   demonstrated	   that	   Timor-­‐Leste’s	   semi-­‐presidential	   system	   failed	   to	  regulate	  conflict.	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Notes	  1. Mouvement	  National	  pour	  la	  Societé	  de	  Développement.	  2. Given	  that	  cohabitation	  does	  not	  prevail	  under	  minority	  governments,	  presidential	  sanctions	  will	  target	  both	  the	  cabinet	  and	  parliamentary	  majority.	  Cohabitation	  cum	  minority	  government	  is	  coined	  a	  “divided	  minority	  government”	  (Skach,	  2005:	  17).	  3. Frente	  Revolucionária	  de	  Timor-­‐Leste	  Independente.	  4. Apart	  from	  two	  independent	  ministers.	  5. In	  his	  blog	  post	  on	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  Elgie	  identified	  the	  government	  form	  between	  2002	  and	  2006	  as	  a	  possible	  period	  of	  cohabitation	  (Elgie,	  2011).	  6. We	  may	  even	  argue	  that	  political	  division	  between	  President	  Gusmão	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  Alkatiri	  was	  greater	  than	  in	  a	  typical	  situation	  of	  cohabitation	  for	  personal	  feuds	  are	  often	  more	  intense	  and	  more	  resistant	  to	  change.	  So,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  already	  existing	  personal	  feuds	  cohabitation	  may	  generate	  political	  conflicts	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  
	  7. Parliamentary	  law	  9/2003	  of	  18	  October	  “Immigration	  and	  Asylum	  Act”	  (Imigração	  e	  Asilo).	  8. Parliamentary	  law	  nº	  1/2006	  of	  8	  February	  2006	  “Freedom	  of	  Assembly	  and	  Demonstration”.	  (Liberdade	  de	  Reunião	  e	  de	  Manifestação),	  Government	  decree	  law	  19/2009	  of	  8	  April	  2009	  “Penal	  Code”	  (Código	  Penal).	  9. Parliamentary	  law	  5/2002	  of	  16	  August	  2002	  “Revenue	  System	  Amendment	  Act”	  (Modificação	  do	  Sistema	  Tributário).	  10. Constitution	  of	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste	  (2002).	  All	  subsequent	  references	  made	  to	  the	  Constitution	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste	  are	  drawn	  from	  this	  document.	  11. Parliamentary	  law	  1/2005	  of	  9	  February	  2005	  “Law	  on	  the	  Council	  of	  State”	  (Lei	  do	  Conselho	  de	  Estado),	  Parliamentary	  law	  2/2005	  of	  3	  March	  2005	  “Law	  on	  the	  Superior	  Council	  for	  Defence	  and	  Security”	  (Lei	  Do	  Conselho	  De	  Estado	  de	  Defesa	  e	  Segurança).	  12. Parliamentary	  resolution	  12/2006	  of	  5	  June	  2006	  “On	  the	  emergency	  measures	  to	  overcome	  the	  crisis	  decreed	  by	  H.E.	  President	  Ray	  Kala	  Xanana	  Gusmão”	  (Sobre	  as	  Medidas	  de	  Emergências	  para	  Ultrapassar	  Crise	  Decretadas	  por	  sua	  Excelência	  o	  Presidente	  da	  República,	  Kay	  Rala	  Xanana	  Gusmão).	  See:	  (Ministério	  da	  Justiça,	  2011)	  13. Parliamentary	  Resolution	  4/2007	  of	  8	  March	  2007	  “Treaty	  on	  Certain	  Maritime	  Arrangements	  in	  the	  Timor	  Sea“	  (CMATS)	  (Tratado	  sobre	  Arranjos	  Marítimos	  no	  Mar	  de	  Timor).	  	  14. Parliamentary	  Law	  1/2005	  of	  9	  February	  2005	  “Law	  on	  the	  Council	  of	  State”	  (Lei	  do	  Conselho	  de	  Estado).	  15. Polícia	  Nacional	  de	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  
	  16. Parliamentary	  law	  1/2005	  of	  9	  February	  2005	  “Law	  on	  the	  Council	  of	  State”	  (Lei	  do	  Conselho	  de	  Estado).	  17. Parliamentary	  Resolution	  (Projeto	  de	  Resolução)	  29/2003,	  Presidential	  Decree	  	  4/2003	  of	  10	  March	  2003	  “Appointing	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal”.	  18. Parliamentary	  resolution	  5/2003	  of	  22	  April	  2003	  “On	  the	  Presidential	  Decree	  No.	  4/2003,	  of	  10	  March	  2003,	  Regarding	  the	  Appointment	  of	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal”.	  19. Parliamentary	  law	  1/2005	  of	  9	  February	  2005	  “Law	  on	  the	  Council	  of	  State”	  (Lei	  do	  Conselho	  de	  Estado),	  Parliamentary	  law	  2/2005	  of	  3	  March	  2005	  “Law	  on	  the	  Superior	  Council	  for	  Defence	  and	  Security”	  (Lei	  Do	  Conselho	  De	  Estado	  de	  Defesa	  e	  Segurança).	  20. FALINTIL	  –	  Força	  de	  Defesa	  de	  Timor-­‐Leste.	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